

# SECURITY AUDIT REPORT

## Hatom depeg-strategy MultiversX smart contract

by  **ARDA**

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# Disclaimer

The report makes no statements or warranties, either expressed or implied, regarding the security of the code, the information herein or its usage. It also cannot be considered as a sufficient assessment regarding the utility, safety and bugfree status of the code, or any other statements.

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# Terminology

**Code:** The code with which users interact.

**Inherent risk:** A risk for users that comes from a behavior inherent to the code's design.

Inherent risks only represent the risks inherent to the code's design, which are a subset of all the possible risks. **No inherent risk doesn't mean no risk.** It only means that no risk inherent to the code's design has been identified. Other kind of risks could still be present. For example, the issues not fixed incur risks for the users, or the upgradability of the code might also incur risks for the users.

**Issue:** A behavior unexpected by the users or by the project, or a practice that increases the chances of unexpected behaviors to appear.

**Critical issue:** An issue intolerable for the users or the project, that must be addressed.

**Major issue:** An issue undesirable for the users or the project, that we strongly recommend to address.

**Medium issue:** An issue uncomfortable for the users or the project, that we recommend to address.

**Minor issue:** An issue imperceptible for the users or the project, that we advise to address for the overall project security.

# Objective

Our objective is to share everything we have found that would help assessing and improving the safety of the code:

1. The **inherent risks** of the code, labelled R1, R2, etc.
2. The **issues** in the **code**, labelled C1, C2, etc.
3. The **issues** in the **testing** of the code, labelled T1, T2, etc.
4. The **issues** in the **other** parts related to the code, labelled O1, O2, etc.
5. The **recommendations** to address each issue.

# Audit Summary

## Initial scope

- **Repository:**  
<https://github.com/HatomProtocol/hatom-isolated-lending-protocol>
- **Commit:** 38bbaabab2804e120727a2a108f797746a01c716
- **MultiversX smart contract path:** ./depeg-strategy/

## Final scope

- **Repository:**  
<https://github.com/HatomProtocol/hatom-isolated-lending-protocol>
- **Commit:** 4c79d63e7d7f56302af88e295321259b8b456359
- **MultiversX smart contract path:** ./depeg-strategy/

## 2 inherent risks in the final scope

### 0 issue in the final scope

8 issues reported in the initial scope and 0 remaining in the final scope:

Severity	Reported			Remaining		
	Code	Test	Other	Code	Test	Other
Critical	0	0	0	0	0	0
Major	3	0	0	0	0	0
Medium	1	0	0	0	0	0
Minor	4	0	0	0	0	0

# Inherent Risks

## **R1: USH borrowers might experience redemptions even if USH has not depegged.**

This is because redemptions are activated when the smart contract assesses that USH has depegged, however this assessment uses the USH:EGLD price and USD:EGLD price obtained from oracles (from xExchange EGLD-USH liquidity pool and Hatom price aggregator respectively), which might make mistake.

## **R2: USH holders have no guarantee that redemptions will be activated when USH depegs.**

When USH depeg, USH holders would expect redemptions to be activated to help the USH price recover.

However it might not be the case, because redemptions are activated when the smart contract assesses that USH has depegged, however this assessment uses the USH:EGLD price and USD:EGLD price obtained from oracles (from xExchange EGLD-USH liquidity pool and Hatom price aggregator respectively), which might fail to return prices or make mistake.

Therefore, it is possible that USH depegs but the depeg is not detected, and then redemptions would not be activated.

# Code Issues & Recommendations

Since the code is not open-source, only the remaining issues are published.

